

GEO

Guyana Economic Opportunities

Data, Information and Analytical Training Needs of the Government of Guyana in the Performance of International Trade Functions

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to
**United States Agency for International Development
Georgetown, Guyana**

Under Contract No. 504-C-00-99-00009-00

August 2000

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List of Acronyms

ACP	Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific
CACM	Central America Common Market
CAGI	Coordinating Group for Guyanese Industry
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CET	Common External Tariff
COFOR	Council for Foreign and Community Relations
COTED	Council for Trade and Economic Development
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Area
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GEO	Guyana Economic Opportunities (Project)
GOG	Government of Guyana
GO-INVEST	Guyana Office of Investment
GRDB	Guyana Rice Development Board
GRMEDA	Guyana Rice Millers and Exporters Development Association
HS	Harmonized System
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIS	Management Information System
MTN	Multilateral Trade Negotiations
MTTI	Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry
NACEN	National
NGMC	New Guyana Marketing Corporation
RNM	Regional Negotiating Machinery
TIC	Trade Investment Commission
TNC	Trade Negotiating Committee
TPRM	Trade Policy Review Mechanism
TRC	Trade Reference Center
TUC	Trade Union Congress
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USTR	United States Trade Representative
WTO	World Trade Organization

I. Recommendations

The basic recommendations in this paper are as follows:

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry (MTTI) play important but distinct roles in trade policy formulation and implementation. The MFA is increasingly coordinating Guyana's national input into CARICOM policy making related to CARICOM's relations with foreign countries. The MTTI is taking the lead in Guyanese participation in the new single CARICOM market. Also, along with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Authority for Customs and Trade, the MTTI provides the principal technical backup to the overall coordinating role played by the MFA.

The current institutional structure of CARICOM reinforces this bifurcation. The newly established Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) is now the lead CARICOM institution in supporting member state participation in such extra-regional negotiations as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement and the CARICOM-Cuban FTA. The CARICOM Secretariat is responsible for the continued implementation of the Single Market. Thus, the MFA works more closely with the RNM, the MTTI works closely with the Secretariat.

The overriding recommendation for organizing the functions of these two Ministries is to emphasize collegial approaches to issues. This means that these recommendations should be fully vetted with each of these Ministries to assure their commitment to their implementation.

2. The best way to coordinate is to establish a high-level coordination mechanism between the MFA and MTTI. This paper suggests that the Permanent Secretary in the MTTI and the Director-General for External Negotiations in the MFA should be charged with the responsibility for developing and implementing a coordination mechanism since they are the leading sub-cabinet trade officials in their ministries responsible for trade policy matters. Fortunately the current incumbents of these positions are both highly qualified and motivated professionals and should be able to work through these issues in a cooperative fashion.
3. The semi-autonomous Statistical Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and the Authority for Customs and Tariffs should focus on improving the collection and presentation of foreign trade data to meet MTTI needs.

4. The census of Guyanese manufacturing should be revised to include more detailed subdivisions on products, should be more textual as opposed to numerical data, and should not exclude business operations with 10 or less employees. It could be modeled after censuses carried out in Barbados.
5. The Government should set up a trade reference center to include an on-line reference system. Users would be those agencies involved in trade policy decisions such as the MFA, the Foreign Trade division of the MTTI, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Authority for Customs and Trade and the Bureau of Statistics, the National Bureau of Standards, and the Guyana Office for Investment (Go-Invest). The reference center should also be available to the private sector participants in the NACEN.
6. The WTO information center and RNM's FTAA documentation center should be part of the overall trade reference center. Regardless of the agency in which the WTO information center is located, access to it should be provided to all users of the reference center and its output should be circulated to member groups.
7. Government funding should be set aside for a reference librarian to organize and periodically update the system.
8. The MIS expert should work with other agencies and private sector groups involved in the formulation of trade policy to make sure they have sufficient hardware, software and technical expertise to stay on line and to access and use the reference center. In the interim, the trade reference center should maintain both electronic and hard copies of its information.
9. Guyana needs experts in agriculture, customs, government procurement, intellectual property rights, investment, services, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, trade remedy laws, and industrial standards. The Government should maintain an inventory of personnel with expertise to meet these requirements. A training profile should be developed for each position and should determine the training opportunities of the current incumbent of the position. Agencies employing these experts should guarantee to make them available for assignment to interagency groups working on these issues.
10. Training decisions should be made jointly by the MTTI Permanent Secretary and the MFA Director General for External Negotiations. They should make sure that training is provided based on Government needs, not bureaucratic considerations. Training opportunities should be apportioned based on general trade policy requirements and on the need for technical expertise.
11. The two officials should also make certain that donor countries are approached to provide training resources where needed.

12. The private sector participants in the NACEN process should develop trade expertise on their staff, which would be included within any trade skill inventory.
13. Donor agencies should work with Government officials to develop a monthly program where experts are brought in to familiarize Guyanese private and public sector officials with the most current trade policy developments.
14. Training should be provided to make sure that Government officials in charge of the NACEN have experience in private-sector-government relationships. The training should address a number of techniques for making abstruse official proceedings and debates on complicated trade policy matters relevant to the private sector.
15. In addressing Guyana's implementation of WTO obligations, special attention needs to be paid to the informational and training needs of those responsible for specific obligations. The WTO should provide technical assistance in those implementing areas where it is needed.
16. One particular area where training is needed is in devising and implementing trade remedy laws. Currently, the only type of relief which can be offered to producers claiming injury from imports are duty increases up to CARICOM or bound duty rates. Trade remedy laws allow more leeway to raise duties without reference to bound levels. However, these laws are complicated and expensive to enforce and can result in WTO complaints against Guyana if they are not properly implemented.

Guyana should develop appropriate expertise to decide whether it needs these laws as well as the ability to challenge other countries' laws if they impede its exports. This expertise may more appropriately be lodged at the CARICOM level but at least one Guyanese official should be able to implement the rules.

II. Introduction

Before making recommendations on the data, information and training needs of the Government of Guyana (GOG), it is vital to understand how the Government formulates and implements its policies. Since CARICOM increasingly interacts with national governments on trade matters, it is also important to understand how the regional grouping's institutions relate to Guyana's government structures.

First, these issues will be discussed, following which recommendations will be provided concerning how to upgrade the ability of the GOG to respond to trade questions. This report will address (1) collection, handling and dissemination of data on the economy, (2) the extraction and use of information in the formulation of Guyana's policy toward implementation of the single CARICOM market and on the external trade policy of CARICOM and (3) appropriate training for Guyanese trade officials, both in the Government and the private sector. Additionally, specific recommendations on how to improve these activities will be made.

The foreign trade function can be subdivided by the fora where negotiations and implementation take place or according to the subject that is under consideration. There are four levels where negotiations, and possible implementation, take place. The first is Guyanese domestic trade legislation and the necessity to vet many provisions of it to make sure that they are consistent with CARICOM requirements. Therefore, this document discusses this topic with the second level of negotiations—that of the CARICOM single market.

The third involves the daily work of the WTO. This includes the required WTO notifications of Guyanese laws and regulations. Second are the modifications to these instruments needed to be in conformity with WTO obligations. Third is the periodic WTO review of member trade policy whereby the multilateral community scrutinizes Guyana's implementation of trade policy.

The fourth is Guyana's participation in CARICOM consideration of negotiations involving non-members. This includes 1) multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the WTO; 2) hemispheric negotiations to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); 3) negotiations and implementation of ACP-EU Partnership Agreements; 4) negotiations of free trade agreements with neighboring countries, and 5) consultations with a number of countries not involved in free trade negotiations.

Another way to analyze trade policy is to subdivide the trade policy function into subjects. Often the same Guyanese experts have the lead in the (1) development and implementation of Guyanese laws and regulations and in assuring their consistency with Guyanese trade obligations, (2) negotiation of CARICOM Single Market commitments and (3) Guyanese participation in CARICOM negotiations under the WTO, FTAA, EU-ACP Partnership and FTA frameworks. Thus, regardless of whether one is considering changes in the Common External Tariff (CET), temporary duty increases under CARICOM single market, market

access positions in the FTAA or the WTO or offer/request/exception lists in CARICOM, WTO, FTAA, Partnership or FTA negotiations, the Trade Policy (or Foreign Trade) Division of MTTI is in the lead for manufactured products and works closely with the Ministry of Agriculture for farm products. Similarly, the Authority for Customs and Tariffs will be called upon for customs decisions no matter where the issue is raised.

III. Organization Of GOG Trade Functions

A. Internal Legislation and Single Market

The MTTI is the principle unit dealing with domestic trade legislation and coordinating participation in the CARICOM single market. The development of the single CARICOM market involves two types of activities. The first is participating in CARICOM decision-making and implementing CARICOM decisions. The most intensive work in the trade area is currently being carried out in the areas of standards, intellectual property rights (IPR), and customs. Guyanese representation is carried out by the Foreign Trade Unit in the MTTI for standards setting, the MFA for IPR and the Authority for Customs and Trade for Customs. However, as pointed out above, MTTI will rely on agricultural or customs expertise depending on the subject.

Secondly, the MTTI oversees the evolution of CARICOM tariffs and presents the Guyanese position on requests to lower or eliminate duties against third-country imports in contravention of the CET. These requests are submitted to enable producers and/or consumers in petitioning countries to relieve short supply situations. Often these requests are accompanied by a second request to treat the third-country import as a CARICOM product for origin rules requirements.

Recent petitions have emanated from Trinidad and Tobago and include temporary elimination of the CET on wooden cylinders for match sticks and cigarette wrapping paper. A number of countries have requested the right to eliminate the CET on imported ingredients, allegedly in short supply, used in the manufacture of juice concentrates. In most cases, these requests are accompanied by a second request that the third-country import be counted as a CARICOM product for meeting origin requirements. The MTTI also evaluates requests from CARICOM on behalf of member countries to temporarily re-impose duties against imports from other CARICOM countries. In these cases, MTTI gathers and evaluates private sector inputs. For agricultural products, MTTI works with the Ministry of Agriculture and the New Guyanese Marketing Corporation (NGMC) since it does not possess agricultural expertise.

The MTTI also accepts petitions from Guyanese industry for reductions in the CET and liberalization in origin rules when necessary to deal with short supply situations. The Ministry evaluates the petition and then, if it believes it has merit, it presents it to CARICOM for member state consideration.

MTTI is the lead agency for safeguard matters where member states request the right temporarily to re-impose duties on imports from CARICOM members and/or to raise the CET. MTTI is working closely with the Ministry of Agriculture to decide how to respond to a local Guyanese petition to raise the CET against unexpected surges in poultry parts imports from the United States, which overwhelm the Guyanese market. One of the complications in this case is that the alleged disruptive action does not seem to strictly fall under WTO dumping or safeguard statutes since they involve single shipments of large quantities of poultry parts—sufficiently large to dry up demand for local production.

B. External Relations

The Cabinet has decided that the MFA will coordinate Guyana's overall positions for most negotiations beyond CARICOM including those for the WTO, FTAA and ACP-EU. In such negotiations, most specific issues will be managed by the MTTI and other governmental technical entities since the MFA does not have functional responsibility or the expertise to follow any single issue. The exception is Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). This occurred by default since the Attorney General did not want to assume this controversial portfolio and MTTI actually provides the backup.

The MFA coordinated Guyanese positions for the Seattle WTO Ministerial. Guyana itself does not have a resident representative to the WTO in Geneva, instead relying on its High Commissioner in London to handle these duties. CARICOM coordinated some but not all positions in Seattle. Guyana's Foreign Minister was the CARICOM spokesman in Seattle.

Under a Cabinet directive, if the Millennium Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) had been launched, the MFA would have both coordinated the Guyanese position and been the Guyanese representative at meetings of CARICOM Ministers and of the Trade Negotiating Committee. MTTI would have led on market access, investment, services and standards. Customs would have been charged with customs, and Agriculture, with agricultural matters.

It is not clear which Ministry, if any, is handling issues that overlap between Guyanese domestic legislation, the single market, and participation in multilateral organizations. It is also unclear who, if anyone, is coordinating overall Guyanese conformity with WTO implementation requirements. It is also not apparent who will handle a WTO review of Guyanese trade policies when one is scheduled under the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). According to the WTO Secretariat, Guyana is not now scheduled for TPRM.

A major part of the TPRM is responses by the member state that will serve as the basis for scrutiny by other member states. This is a particularly important exercise for Guyana since it will force the country to review the management of its trade policy and how it measures up to international standards. Countries that are not ready for review and do poorly may find that they are subject to multilateral pressure, especially from the multilateral development banks, to bring their policies into conformity.

The MFA is coordinating Guyana's position in the FTAA. The MFA covers the Ministerial, the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) and the Consultative Group on Small Economies. Guyanese officials only attend three of the ten negotiating groups. These are the negotiating groups on market access and investment (attended by the MTTI) and on agriculture (attended by the Ministry of Agriculture). The Customs and Trade Authority may work with the MTTI on the customs aspects of the market access group since they had worked with the MFA on preparation of business facilitation submissions to the TNC. Also, the MTTI may work with the Guyana Office of Investment (Go-Invest) in the negotiating group on investment.

As for the negotiating groups in which Guyana will not be represented, they will make inputs into the work of the RNM described in greater detail in Section IV below. MTTI is backing up the negotiating group on services and MFA is backing up the group on IPR.

Guyana devotes few resources to the other groups, namely those on competition policy, dispute settlement, government procurement and trade remedies. We believe that failure to more actively participate in government procurement and trade remedies may be a mistake since these are areas where Guyana needs domestic legislation. We understand that the Ministry of Finance has been reluctant to devote resources to these exercises. If this situation persists, the MTTI may have to participate although additional resources may be necessary.

A similar division of responsibilities occurred for the negotiation of the new EU-ACP Partnership Agreement to replace Lome IV. The MFA coordinated Guyanese participation in these negotiations. The MTTI and other government entities provided support for specific trade topics. Thus, MTTI was in the lead in presenting Guyana's position to CARICOM for negotiations on preferential agreements with Venezuela in 1992, and Colombia in 1994, and more recently in the completed FTA negotiations with the Dominican Republic and ongoing FTA negotiations with the Central American Common Market (CACM). It is not clear, however, who will play the key role in the impending free trade negotiations with Cuba.

In some areas, the MTTI has responsibilities for coordinating Guyanese policies, including the following

1. The MTTI is the official WTO focus or contact point for required Guyanese notifications concerning Guyana's trade regime. Agencies responsible for specific functions submit their notifications to MTTI, which in turn submits them to the WTO.
2. MTTI coordinates Guyanese positions in the CARICOM Council on Trade and Economic Development that discusses trade, agriculture, services, tourism and other sector issues. As discussed in greater detail below, this Council now vets RNM reports before they go to the Prime Minister Subcommittee on External Negotiations.

3. The MTTI is the government representative on the Trade and Investment Commission (TIC), which is one of three groups meeting under the umbrella of the MFA-US State Department-chaired CARICOM-US consultative mechanism.
4. CBI Enhancement legislation provides for a consultation mechanism between CBI trade ministers and the USTR. Since trade ministers will be involved, there is a good chance that the MTTI will be in the lead.

Created in August 1997 to coordinate government policy in CARICOM negotiations, so far the NACEN has served mainly as a tool for CARICOM and Guyanese government officials to brief members of the private sector on developments in the trade field. The Committee is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and co-chaired by the Minister of Trade, Tourism and Industry. The MFA appears to play the leading role since it provides the Secretariat function. The Ministries of Finance and Agriculture round out governmental members. Private sector representatives are from private business and business organizations, such as the Private Sector Commission, the Coordinating Group for Guyanese Industry (CAGI) the Guyanese Association of Manufacturers and Demerara Distillers Limited (DDL), a beverage producer; the agricultural sector, including the Guyanese Sugar Company (GUYSUCO), the Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB) and Guyana Rice Millers and Exporters Development Association (GRMEDA); labor groups, including the Trade Union Congress (TUC); and academia, such as the University of Guyana. The NACEN is served by a Technical Coordinator in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Private sector consultation is split between the two Ministries. As mentioned above, MFA appears to have the lead in the NACEN. On the other hand, MTTI receives inputs from the private sector on product and services priorities in trade negotiations and uses these inputs to develop official positions on offer, requests and exception lists. MTTI also receives inputs from the private sector on proposals for permanent and temporary modifications in the CARICOM tariff schedules, specifically the CET and temporary safeguards against CARICOM imports.

IV. CARICOM's Organization Of Trade Negotiations

The need for a unified CARICOM negotiating position became apparent as the Caribbean sought to establish an economic relationship with the enlarged European Economic Community (EEC) in the early 1970s. The need continued as the original agreement between ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and the ACP Agreement was extended at five or ten-year intervals. CARICOM had to develop unified positions first for negotiations with ACP states and then for ACP negotiations with the EU.

Unified positions had to be developed for such multilateral negotiations as sub regional economic integration proceeded. There could only be a unified position for market access negotiations as CARICOM adopted a common external tariff and common customs

procedures. As Caribbean economic integration deepened, more negotiating subjects required unified positions.

A suggestion to establish a special negotiating machinery for CARICOM was accepted in 1997 for a number of reasons. First, multilateral, plurilateral and regional negotiations and consultations became more numerous and more complex and the number of negotiations that CARICOM held as a unit continued to increase. At this time, CARICOM is involved in preliminary talks to launch another round of multilateral trade negotiations. CARICOM was also fully participating in FTAA negotiations and had just completed the fifth renewal of the ACP agreement with the EU.

Second, before the Uruguay Round, CARICOM members could ignore many of the details of multilateral negotiations. Developing countries were not required to accept many of the obligations negotiated and most of the key decisions were made by a small group of developed countries. However, the situation changed with the Uruguay Round, as countries wishing to become part of the new WTO had to accept all the negotiated obligations rather than being able to pick and choose which obligations to accept. The only derogation for middle-level developing countries like CARICOM was the extension of deadlines for assuming obligations and the ability to bind their duties at ceiling or above applied rates. In the CARICOM case, these ceiling bindings were above the CET meaning that countries could raise duties without justification. The obligations also increasingly addressed internal as opposed to border measures. Countries found that their ability to assist domestic industry, promote foreign investment, regulate intellectual property and control the operation of its services trade were increasingly impinged upon by trading rules.

Third, CARICOM members decided to engage in free trade negotiations with neighboring countries. These included partial free trade with Colombia and Venezuela, now up for renewal; the recently concluded negotiations with the Dominican Republic; the ongoing talks with the Central American Common Market (CACM); and the impending negotiations with Cuba.

Fourth, in addition to formal trade negotiations, CARICOM also worked with Member States to establish unified positions in the three consultations mechanisms (Canada, Mexico and the United States), which may eventually lead to free trade negotiations.

Fifth, it became apparent that if CARICOM members were to have any influence, they would have to organize. After all, most countries were now participating in some type of a sub-regional grouping and CARICOM members were simply too small to go it alone.

Sixth, the CARICOM Secretariat was fully engaged in implementing the single market and suggested that a special negotiating machinery be created. The member states reacted by creating the RNM in 1997. The RNM was located outside of CARICOM headquarters with locations in Bridgetown, Kingston, London, Washington and an expected presence in one of the national Missions in Geneva. It was headed by two respected political figures -- chief negotiator

Sir Shridath Ramphal and advisory committee chairman Alister McIntyre -- and staffed by seasoned trade negotiators. It reports directly to the Prime Ministerial Subcommittee on External Negotiations, which is staffed by Foreign Ministry officials.

RNM's role is not equivalent to that of the EC Commission, which leads most negotiations since member state representatives are basically backseat advisors. CARICOM is not a member or a recognized negotiating entity in a number of multilateral fora. Unlike the European Union, CARICOM is not a member of the WTO. Implementation of WTO commitments is carried out on a country-by-country, rather than on a sub-regional basis. WTO trade policy reviews are carried out on the trade policy of a country, rather than on sub-regional policies. In the product area, although there are CARICOM-wide commitments, tariff schedules are still notified on a country basis. Members, not CARICOM, notify services commitments. Designation of countries eligible for preferential treatment under the GSP and CBI is on a national, not a CARICOM basis. Also, CARICOM is a member of neither the FTA process nor Lomé and thus must participate through its Member States.

Before the establishment of the RNM in April, 1997, foreign trade negotiations and relationships were the responsibility of the CARICOM Secretariat with final approval of positions generally residing with the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), which consists of member state Trade Ministers. Initially, the RNM submitted its plans for negotiations through the Prime Ministers subgroup, which is largely staffed by Foreign Ministries. However, in recognition of the Trade Ministers' expertise, the RNM now discusses its detailed negotiating plans with COTED before submitting them to the Chiefs of State. It is clear that the current momentum favors an increase in the negotiating role of the RNM on behalf of CARICOM members. Also, whatever control is to be exercised on paper over the RNM, the control will be diluted as negotiations move into their detailed stages. The issues are simply too complicated and events are moving too quickly.

The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), which is composed of Foreign Ministers, coordinates CARICOM participation in various sub-regional consultations with Canada and Mexico. COFCOR also develops positions for consultations with the United States. The Ministry of Trade is the Guyanese representation to one of the three subgroups under this umbrella--the Trade and Investment Council (TIC).

Guyana's Ambassadors in Brussels and Washington coordinate trade as well as other policy with the other CARICOM Ambassadors. The High Commissioner in London, in the absence of a resident mission, is Guyana's representative to the WTO.

V. Recommendations

A. Data

It is clear that the MTTI and other trade-related agencies need data to make educated input in their areas of CARICOM responsibility: market access in multilateral, regional and sub-regional FTAs and reactions to requests to temporarily modify CARICOM tariff levels and to develop trade promotion strategies.

The Ministry needs data on trade flows and the direction of trade for a number of reasons. First, the Ministry must have a basis for deciding with which country to negotiate free trade areas. For negotiations in which CARICOM participates on behalf of its members, Guyana must submit its recommendations for request/offer/exception lists and must also respond to counter proposals. The MTTI also needs information for dealing with requests for modification and suspension of CET and for the implementation of safeguards. To respond to these needs, the Ministry needs data on both current and future Guyanese exports, imports and production. To be useful, such data must show the trend over a number of years in imports and exports of specific products as well as the direction of trade.

The trade information is available from the Guyana Customs and Trade Administration. Since adoption of the Asycuda classification system, Guyana has maintained an impressive system of import/export data. The information contains 16 fields of information including import/export breakdown based on a 10-digit breakdown of the Harmonized System of Tariff classification, origin of imports or destination of exports and the names of the exporter/producer or the importer/end user. The Commission disseminates the information on disk.

Unfortunately, neither Customs nor the Department of Statistics in the Ministry of Finance manipulates the data in a satisfactory manner for trade negotiations. Although the MTTI has sufficient computer equipment to store and utilize the data, the equipment donated by USAID/WTO must be made workable to be effective. Finally, massaging the Asycuda with other software would allow Asycuda data to be corrected for entry errors or delayed clearance.

The GEO MIS specialist believes that the data contains enough fields of information so it can be manipulated to satisfy the needs of the Ministry. Also, the computers are being refurbished to allow the storage and transmittal of the data.

Even after manipulation, the data is still not detailed enough to be used without further analysis for a number of tasks. For example, as mentioned above, CARICOM requests for member government assent to waive the CET are for very specific products. No matter how sophisticated the tariff data under 10-digit HS classifications, it does not identify import and export data in such detail. These products are included in baskets, meaning they are subsumed in more general HS number. However, this statistical breakdown is still important since it can provide clues as to which firms are exporting the product.

For example, the statistical breakout might identify paper used for manufacturing. It would not identify paper used for wrapping cigarettes as needed in the request from Trinidad and Tobago to suspend the Common External Tariff. However, MTTI officials developing a response to the Trinidad and Tobago request can look at the basket, determine exporters of papers used in manufacturing and inquire of them whether they produce the subject paper used to wrap cigarettes. MTTI can then ascertain the consequence of acceding to the CARICOM request for adjustment of tariff levels and origin requirements.

The major weakness of this approach is that it determines exporters of the products but not producers. This would not be a problem if Guyana were competitive enough that all, or nearly all, of its producers were also exporters. Since this is not true, the Ministry needs some way to correlate export data with production data. A correlation between import/export and production data is necessary to deal with safeguard cases where one is determining whether surging imports are causing problems to domestic producers. One can determine producers who are exporters but not producers selling only on the domestic market. Ironically, producers who do not export are generally the least competitive and thus are most likely to be harmed from lower-priced competition since they are the very ones unable today to compete on the world market. This is true in CET cases where prices are lowered through CET duty reductions and in safeguard cases where imports are entering at low prices. Also, the correlation misses current producers who may have the potential to export in the future.

The available production data must include small and medium-sized producers as well as large producers. Usually, small producers are the most vulnerable to low-price competition. However, they frequently go in and out of business and are hard to reach, and therefore represent the most difficult subjects to include in a production survey.

It is probably too ambitious and not worth the effort for the GOG to collect production data and to collate it in sufficient detail to be useful to trade analysts.

To summarize this section, the follow points are highlighted:

- 1) Although correlations exist between the Harmonized System (HS) classifications for imports and exports and Industrial Standards for International Classification (ISIC) for production, they are not accurate enough to allow identification of priorities. As with HS numbers, ISIC numbers contain many basket categories where products are not defined but simply grouped together. Although the import-export data is available, the problem with miscellaneous or basket categories is that they miss many products.
- 2) The current census of Guyanese manufacturing covers less than 200 products and excludes firms with less than ten employees.

- 3) Given the existing number of Government personnel available for such an exercise, the expectation that companies would be concerned about supplying information, the difficulty of maintaining data, companies predilection for secrecy (taxing authority, competition pressure), it would be difficult to collect data with sufficient comprehensiveness to assist in detailed production analysis.
- 4) Even if such tables could be created, it would be difficult to collect and maintain accurate data over time. Even if businesses agreed to make the original submission, they would be reluctant to devote resources to update their submissions. The Government would also have to devote considerable resources, which might not be justified by the outcome.

Fortunately, Guyana is a small enough country that human knowledge can often substitute for statistical correlations. Thus textual information is just as important as the statistical data collected in the questionnaire. Firms can be asked to supply textual information on the products they produce and where they hope to market it. The questionnaire can be organized on the basis of two or four-digit ISIC numbers with any further sophistication being captured in textual responses to specific questions.

Once collected, the textual information can be placed on computer files. Guyanese authorities should decide how to safeguard the information. A system of keywords could be developed which would provide access to information needed for formulating trade policies and responding to petitions. A requirement for trade officials involved in market access should be general familiarity with this textual database.

The questionnaire should also be developed to gather information on small and medium-sized industry. Past surveys, which excluded firms with fewer than ten employees, missed many small companies. The questionnaire should be a more detailed industrial survey than the current survey. Barbados has such a questionnaire, from which elements could be adapted for use in Guyana. It is suggested that the next step should be a review of such industrial data maintained in Barbados or another CARICOM country in order to develop a model for Guyana. One could also work with a model from a small state in the United States.

An upcoming area of negotiations is services. Guyana is working with the Secretariat to create a services inventory for the Community. Guyana, as other developing countries, undertook few national commitments to either liberalize their markets or to provide national treatment for specific categories of services trade. However, along with agriculture, services is the only discipline currently under WTO negotiations for future rules. The FTAA services group is moving along with less controversy than other negotiating groups. The MTI is leading efforts to develop an inventory of Guyanese services providers as part of the CARICOM single market exercise.

B. Informational Web Sites

In Annex A, a list of web sites is presented that should be used regularly for gathering information for use in developing Guyana's trade policy. By far the most important web sites will be the WTO interactive site; the SIECE site maintained by the OAS and the RNM site on FTAA negotiations. One of the objectives of this project is to make certain that the WTO interactive web site becomes operational for the MTTI and that users in other governmental entities, and if possible the private sector, have access to it as well. The MIS expert is aware of the need for this network to be established.

C. Government Trade Reference Center (TRC)

The MTTI should work with other agencies, possibly through a NACEN subgroup, to establish a central file including a centralized web site for trade information. The site should be developed with close links to the WTO Reference Center and to the web sites of the CARICOM Secretariat and the RNM. All three entities collect and utilize similar documentation in their work. If staff resources allow, the MTTI should upload to its site information from the above groups as well as from the key web addresses listed in annex. If staff time does not allow for this, the sites should be linked.

Web sites by themselves are not sufficient. It is a fact that developing countries such as Guyana cannot rely on electronic information alone. The basic security and reliability of computers and connections to web sites is questionable. The reliability of computers, printers and networks combined with normal infrastructure make it almost impossible to maintain and disseminate information to users solely on an electronic basis. For example, the width and availability of band lines often make it inconvenient for users to gain access to important documents. It is thus suggested that a reference center consist of both electronic and hard copies.

The types of materials to be included in the reference center are:

- WTO documentation
- FTAA documentation.
- CARICOM documentation
- Documentation on preference programs available to Guyanese Exporters
- Documentation of NACEN and other interagency meetings
- Documentation of government-private sector meetings
- Documentation of all Guyanese trade-related submissions to multilateral and regional entities
- Statistical runs prepared for the trade community

The ideal system would allow for these documents to be kept on the trade web site, on disks and in hard-copy format. Access would be provided to a group of end-users that would include:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs–the Coordinator of NACEN
- MTTI–the Foreign Trade Division
- MTTI–Bureau of Standards
- Ministry of Agriculture
- The Authority for Customs and Trade
- Bureau of Statistics
- The Guyana Office for Investment (Go-Invest)
- Private Sector participants in the NACEN

The Ministry of Finance is not on this list, at least for the moment, since it is not participating in interagency work on trade matters. They have a legitimate claim to lead work on trade remedies and government procurement. However, they do not seem to wish to lead or even participate in such work. MTTI is thus in the best position to take the lead. In any case, the agency in charge of Government procurement should provide support to the work on government procurement.

Given its controlling role in fiscal matters and given that trade duties are important sources of revenue, the Finance Ministry usually plays a leading role in tariff negotiations. However, since the Guyanese tariff structure is almost completely determined by CARICOM, to which MTTI has been the lead liaison, the Finance Ministry has not been involved in market access negotiations. Having said this, it would be expected that Finance would participate more actively given its role in implementing any IMF program to enhance government revenues.

A librarian or filing expert should be assigned to the Trade Ministry for a period of six months. During that time, a system can be developed for collecting, filing and distributing key documents. The expert should develop a system with sufficient backup. It should involve documents saved on hard drive and CDS as well as in written form.

The TRC should keep a central register of all users of such documentation. They should note whether electronic communication and records are sufficient or whether paper communication and records are necessary as well. They should also make sure that information received by the Ministry of Trade is appropriately distributed to other agencies requiring this information. They should keep an inventory of all incoming documents on their website so other Ministries, Government entities and the private sector can have access to the information.

This document does not suggest where the reference center should be located. However, it is noted that the center should be placed in a single location and cover all the trade policy needs of the Government. The need for a single site could create an immediate challenge since there are two possible locations. The Foreign Ministry is already Guyana's coordinator for most extra CARICOM issues and will host the FTAA web site currently being constructed by the RNM to house FTAA documents. The MTTI currently has more detailed expertise on technical trade knowledge and will host the WTO Interactive Information Center. Wherever the center is

located, the staff of the host organization will have to assure that the information on the site is kept up-to-date and old or non-relevant documentation is removed.

The next step in implementing this process involves computer support for interagency coordination. The MIS expert should make an inventory of hardware available to the participants in the project that can be fully or partially dedicated to the project. He should then recommend improvements needed in each of the participating entities to facilitate their use of the system.

The agency in charge of the system should work closely with the Bureau of Statistics and Customs to make sure that Guyanese foreign trade data is available in a form useful to the users of the system. The expert should also recommend whether a closed or open access system should be used. Participants in the system must agree to undertake the required investment to enable them to take advantage of the newly available materials.

The Government should make a commitment to provide funding for a research librarian or to contract a data processing service to maintain the reference center. This must be a continual commitment since one cannot expect a single agency to devote the necessary staff time to a system from which it would not benefit. If it is decided that a single agency should be responsible, users of the system should be assessed a fee to be paid to the administering agency. Once these decisions are made, a short-term expert with experience in actually going on-line with this activity should be made available. Although the Government would have to make a commitment to dedicate long-term resources to maintain this project, short-term implementation may require the support of a donor entity.

The recommendations in this document for an information system are much more limited than that provided for in earlier studies prepared on this topic in Guyana. A recommendation on reorganizing the trade function in the Building Equity & Economic Participation Project (BEEP) study in 1997 envisioned a much more ambitious system relying on data from domestic and foreign sources with manipulation being carried out in the Ministry of Trade. The current paper argues that given the subordinate role Guyana plays to the CARICOM community in most negotiations and the limited amount of resource available in Guyana, one should begin with a comprehensive system while avoiding the “bells and whistles” add-ons which characterized the BEEP proposal.

D. Training

Guyana must make sure that it has the expertise to deal with the complexities of individual trade issues. Of course, generalists must be in charge of any trade policy team with knowledge in all areas of trade negotiations. However, on the staff level, individuals who are fully conversant within a subject are rapidly replacing generalists with knowledge on all matters. In fact, in a perfect world, Guyana would have one or two generalists in charge of coordination with a team of specialists working under them.

In Guyana's case, this would mean that the MTTI Permanent Secretary and the NACEN Coordinator should be at the apex of the system sharing responsibility for the specific aspects of trade negotiations. How to subdivide the coordinating roles of MFA and MTTI is a subject for another assignment. However, it is clear that a close working relationship between these two sub-Cabinet officials is key to the operation of the system, as it is a prerequisite for having their respective staffs work closely together.

Guyana should identify personnel to handle the following functional needs. The areas where Guyana must have such expertise include agriculture, customs, government procurement, intellectual property rights, investment, services, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and industrial standards. It should not matter to which government or private sector group these experts belong; rather, they should be available for required interagency work on trade issues.

In some cases, the workload may require two experts. The experts would back each other up and in case one expert ceases to work on the project, expertise would remain in place while a second official is trained. A situation is envisaged wherein one of the experts would focus more on international negotiations, while the second on domestic implementation. This appears to be the current model in intellectual property rights where the MFA is the lead with strong backup from the MTTI. MFA, for the moment, appears to be focusing more on domestic legislation, especially in the copyright areas.

Additional expertise should be developed in areas of government procurement and trade remedies. Adhesion to a transparency code for government procurement would both increase government efficiency and reduce on corruption. As Guyana's obligations under the WTO, FTAA and CARICOM give less flexibility to raise duties, trade remedies against unfairly dumped or subsidized imports and low-priced surging imports become more important.

A training profile should be developed for current incumbents of functional trade policy position. As one incumbent replaces another, a new training profile should be created for the replacement.

To develop skills in such areas as IPR or government procurement, individualized training programs should be developed. They should consist of a combination of academic or professional courses and work assignments with national or multilateral governmental institutions or with the private sector. The Monterrey Institute for International Studies, the only institution granting commercial diplomacy degrees, offer courses on specific trade policy topics.

Once training needs are identified for specific areas, GEO may wish to utilize expertise to customize an appropriate training program involving both multilateral, national governmental and private sector expertise.

To the extent possible, all experts with a continuous participation in trade policy formulation should undergo the WTO three-month course for mid-level officials. For those not eligible for these programs, participation should attend the OAS two-week training course for the FTAA.

The proposed Reference Information center should keep track of training needs. The MTTI Permanent Secretary and the NACEN coordinator should remain in close contact with donor agencies to identify where the necessary training can be found and how it can be funded. They should select training programs based on the priorities and needs of the trade sector. It should be within the capabilities of the Government, assisted by Donor Countries, to develop such a program within five years.

Simultaneous to the improvement in training for Government officials, the private sector participants in the NACEN process should develop trade expertise among their staff. Donor agencies should offer to support training for one staff person to follow trade issues. The designated person should be able to convert information and data supplied by the Government into easy to understand briefs for the private sector. The briefs should identify the impact of various Government trade policies on specific economic sectors. The private sector experts should also provide supporting materials for their presentations to the Government.

We are not suggesting on-site training or the posting of a foreign expert in the Ministries. Instead, donor agencies should work with GOG and private sector officials to identify topics of general interest to the public and to trade officials. Foreign experts could then be invited to Guyana to lecture on such issues. For example, future visitors to Guyana could cover issues created by the successor agreement to Lome IV, trade provisions of the new CBI Enhancement bill, ways Guyana can take advantage of specific concessions available in the Uruguay Round, investment promotion and WTO rules, to name but a few such topics.

We foresee periodic events where invited experts could give a public lecture, meet privately with the NACEN, make a courtesy call on appropriate Ministers and possibly hold a press conference. The speakers would work with the private sector liaison officials described above to make sure that the comments were relevant to the interest of the private sector. For example, rather than simply describe the current status of FTAA negotiations, the speaker could address the advantages to Guyana, specifically to the private sector, of moving quickly, as advocated by the United States, or slowly, as advocated by Brazil, in the formation of the FTAA.

E. Implementation of WTO Obligations

There is an immediate need to review Guyana's record of implementing its WTO commitments. There does not seem to be a central location in the Government where such records are kept. Investors and domestic producers expect that the rule of law will operate in Guyana and that the trade regime will be reflective of what is expected under the WTO. Even if for political reasons Guyana does not wish to assume all the obligations, its officials should at least know which obligations it has decided not to implement. Such a study should also advise on the best place to

establish overall responsibility for assessing WTO consistency of the trade regime. With a trade policy review inevitable at some point, Guyanese authorities should be in a position to bring their rules into conformity with obligations rather than be embarrassed by the conclusions of the Review or be subject to multilateral supervision and approval of specific measures. In this regard, the WTO should be approached for assistance in areas where Guyana has not yet met its obligations.

F. Antidumping Legislation and Other Trade Remedies Legislation

In an atmosphere of trade liberalization, domestic producers must have some assurance that they will not be adversely affected by unfairly traded imports. This is particularly important in a small economy where a sudden surge of low-priced dumped or subsidized imports could wreak havoc on domestic production.

For the moment, the only action the Government can take against disruptive imports is to petition CARICOM for the right to re-impose duties on CARICOM imports or to raise the CET against third-country imports. Guyana has no procedures consistent with WTO Article XIX that allows a country to increase protection above bound levels if low-priced imports are surging and causing serious injury to a Guyanese producer. Safeguard actions against disruptive imports outside of CARICOM into Guyana require CARICOM approval. They also must be taken against all suppliers, not only against the surging country, and require strict evidence of serious injury or threat of serious injury. A number of relief actions such as the imposition of arbitrary quotas and uplifts in valuations are considered illegal under the WTO. Safeguard action however is the only remedy available against surges of fairly trade imports.

Similarly, Guyana has no procedures to allow importers who have been harmed by unfairly priced imports to seek unfair trade remedies. The two most popular are antidumping duties against unfair pricing and countervailing duties to offset the effect of government subsidies. However, implementation of these procedures have inherent problems, just as antidumping also has inherent problems. Don McKay, until recently deputy head of the OAS trade unit, has argued that safeguard and/or AD/CVD regimes are extremely complex legislative and regulatory instruments and may not be appropriate for small countries like Guyana. Their effective operation requires far more resources -- both financial and human -- than countries like Guyana may have available for such tasks.

One of the problems revolves around the "challengeability" of both preliminary and final determinations, either at the multilateral level in the WTO or in sub-regional contexts. A country must ensure that each and every specific investigation is conducted fully in accord with international rules if the investigation is going to survive these outside challenges and provide domestic firms relief. One only has to examine certain country cases (i.e., Mexico) to understand that even heavy users of trade remedies laws suffer reversals of decisions on an increasingly frequent basis. This is true even though countries such as Mexico have poured countless millions into building WTO consistent AD/CVD structures. Ergo, such a system

should only be considered by seriously committed countries. The term "serious" here translates into a willingness to assign sufficient resources to both draft legislation and establish the administrative structure needed to implement such legislation. The reader should recall, as well, that the political costs are often higher with a decision that is overturned than with the absence of a decision in the first place.

The above may argue for a CARICOM-based trade remedies system. At a minimum, CARICOM should consider developing a region-wide training program and hiring regional trade remedies experts who can be available to consult with member states who have problems in this area. We therefore suggest that one GEO priority area of information and training would be to allow Guyanese officials to determine the need and feasibility of antidumping/countervailing duty/safeguards laws. Once work is completed on WTO implementation, GEO or another donor agency may want to work with Guyana on developing trade remedy laws.

Trade-Related Web Sites

Multilateral Web Sites:

ILO (<http://www.ilo.org>) and International Labour Organization Labour Statistics Database (<http://laborsta.ilo.org>) - Provides comprehensive information on labour related issues, including the ILO's Core Labour Codes. Increasing amount of information on the issue of trade and labour can also be found here.

IMF (<http://www.imf.org>) - International Monetary Fund. The IMF site has been vastly expanded in the last couple of years in line with the institution's emphasis on increased transparency.

Integrated Framework (<http://www ldc.org>) - for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries. The result of inter-institutional cooperation between the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, this site provides much useful information for countries and individual companies attempting to enhance their export performance.

IPAnet (<http://www.ipanet.com>) - Investment Promotion Agency Network sponsored by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. This site is part of the World Bank group and its focus is on providing information to assist in the promotion of inward directed investment. It's chief strength lies in model investment agreements and other technical issues related to Bilateral Investment Treaties.

IPPC (<http://www.fao.org/wai>)- International Plant Protection Convention. Provides important information with respect to sanitary and phyto-sanitary matters and issues related to agricultural exports.

ISO (<http://www.iso.ch>) - International Organization for Standardization. The multilateral institution that deals primarily with the setting of international standards, including increasingly in the area of environmental practices. ISO certification of corporate practices and processes is internationally recognized and is becoming increasingly critical for positive export performance.

ITC (<HTTP://www.iso.ch>) - International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO). A joint venture, this site is aimed principally at helping developing countries to secure the information necessary for export competitiveness. Also contains a new section aimed at providing specific information for those countries and companies interested in the export of services.

■ Service Exporting Homepage (<HTTP://192.91.247.77/index2.html>)

UN (<http://www.un.org>) - United Nations. The United Nations family of Web sites is vast and contain significant amounts of information. Navigating the sites is not always easy but is ultimately rewarding. The UN maintains a number of specialized Web sites that are issue specific. The most important are listed below.

- Codex Alimentarius Commission (http://www.fao.org/es*/esn/codex/default.htm) - Codex Alimentarius and the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme
- FAO (<http://www.fao.org>) - Food and Agriculture Organization
- UNCTAD (<http://www.unicc.org/unctad>) - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
- UNEP (<http://www.unep.ch>) - United Nations Environment Programme-Trade and Environment
- UNICC (<http://www.unicc.org>) - United Nations International Computing Centre
- UNTPDC - (<http://www.unicc.org/untpdc/welcome.html>) - UN Trade Point Development Centre

WCO (<http://www.wcoomd.org>) - World Customs Organization. The multilateral entity charged with standardization of customs procedures. The Web site has taken quite a while to develop into a useful tool and much remains to be accomplished in this regard. Nevertheless it does contain some useful primary documentation.

- Kyoto Convention (<http://www.unece.org/trade/kyoto/ky-01-e0.htm>)

WIPO (<http://www.wipo.int/eng/index.htm>) - World Intellectual Property Organization. This site has been expanded greatly in the recent past and contains much useful information with respect to national legislation, practices and government authorities with respect to international and national intellectual property issues.

WTO (<http://www.wto.org>) - World Trade Organization. The WTO site started off as being relatively slow and difficult to navigate. Nevertheless in the last two years, it has been expanded dramatically and currently represents one of the best sites in the world. WTO documents are posted on the Document Dissemination Facility and are invaluable for those engaged in trade negotiations. Excellent source of primary documentation.

- Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes
(<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>)

World Bank Group (<http://www.worldbank.org>) - The World Bank is another global leader in providing difficult to find information on the Internet. The site is vast and takes a bit of learning in order to navigate it successfully. Nevertheless it contains much detailed information of interest to national trade authorities.

Hemispheric Web Sites:

ACS (<http://www.acs-aec.org>) - Association of Caribbean States. A small secretariat with a limited budget, the ACS nevertheless provides some useful information. Particularly helpful is a listing of all Caribbean and Latin American export promotion agencies.

AgroInfo Americas (<http://www.agroinfo.org>) - A useful site that provides information pertinent to agricultural exports and agricultural markets in the Americas.

APEC (<http://www.apecsec.org.sg>) - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The APEC site is primarily of interest in that it provides information on a number of countries that are also members of the Western Hemisphere, primarily the United States, Canada and Mexico. The APEC site reproduces much useful primary documentation and statistical data bases, including:

- APEC Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures (<http://www.sccp.org>)
- APEC Tariff Database (<http://www.apectariff.org>)

Caribbean Environment and Sustainable Development

(<http://isis.uwimona.edu.jm/cesd/index1.html>) - A relatively new site, situated in Jamaica, this site provides some current information.

Caribbean Export Development Agency (<http://www.cartis.com>) - This site contains information that would be useful to companies based in the Caribbean region which wish to enhance their export performance. The site still needs some further development to be of maximum use.

CARICOM (<http://www.caricom.org>) - The Caribbean Community Secretariat. While the official CARICOM site has existed for a number of years, the quantity of information available remains limited. Site is plagued by difficulties of navigation and significant periods of "downtime."

- CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery (<http://www.caribmm.net>) - A relatively recent project, the RNM site also suffers from the lack of timely and useful information.

ECLAC (<http://www.eclac.org>) - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. This site provides some useful trade and economic information but has suffered from under-funding for a long time. The following regional offices maintain their own sites which can often contain useful information not kept on the main site. There is a predisposition towards information and studies presented in Spanish.

- Regional Offices:
 - Brasília (<http://www.eclac.org/espanol/investigacion/brasil/brasil.htm>)
 - Buenos Aires (<http://www.eclac.org/espanol/investigacion/buenosaires/pagina.htm>)
 - México (<http://www.un.org.mx/cepal>)

- Port of Spain (<http://www.eclacpos.org>)
- Washington, D.C. (<http://www.eclacwash.org>)

COPANT (<http://www.copant.org>) - Pan American Standards Commission.

Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (<http://www.eccb-centralbank.org>) - Some useful information is provided, although it is limited in scope.

IAAC (<http://www.ibpinetsp.com.br/iaac>) - Inter-American Accreditation Co-operation.

IDB (<http://www.iadb.org>) - Inter-American Development Bank. The IDB site contains much useful information, although navigating the site can at times be difficult. The following subsidiary sites tend to be more useful and contain much more information:

- Office of the Chief Economist (<http://www.iadb.org/oce>) - Economic Research & Development Policy in Latin America.
- Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit (<http://www.iadb.org/int/sta/english/staweb/stats.htm>).
- DataIntal - Hemispheric External Trade Database (<http://database.iadb.org/intalweb/scripts/intal.exe>) - This site contains international trade data for exports and imports by partner for countries of the Western Hemisphere.

IICA (<http://www.iicacan.org>) - Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. This is a specialized site dedicated to agricultural issues. The main site has traditionally been fairly weak, although some of the national sites associated with IICA can be quite strong in their presentation of information.

NAPPO (<http://www.nappo.org>) - North American Plant Protection Organization.

SICE (<http://www.sice.oas.org>) – The Foreign Trade Information Service of the Organization of American States. This is a dedicated service aimed at providing both primary and secondary documentation and information on trade and trade-related issues. The site contains significant amounts of information, but familiarity with the site helps in any navigation efforts.

World Tariff Rates (<http://www.worldtariff.com>) - World Tariff Customs Duty and Tax Information. Although this is a commercial entity, it does contain significant amounts of information that are collated from national sources. It is a fee-based information source.

National Web Sites:

NTDB (<http://www.stat-usa.gov/tradtest.nsf>) - National Trade Data Bank / International Trade Library (USA) (*subscription necessary*).

Penn World Tables (<http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/>) - Computing in the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Toronto, Canada

Strategis (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr_homep.html) - Industry Canada (Canadian and US data, searchable).

United States Department of Commerce: Office of Trade and Economic Analysis (<http://www.ita.doc.gov/tradestats>).

- Foreign Trade Highlights (<http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/>).
- U.S. Commodity Trade by Geographic Area (1994-1998) (<http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/tabcom.html>).
- State Exports to Countries and Regions - International Trade Administration (<http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/state/>).

insideustrade (<http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/>) - This is a commercial site that provides an excellent weekly review of developments in trade policy. It also posts immediate publication of breaking trade policy news.

List of Persons Contacted

Government of Guyana

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Kim Stephen	Director of Trade Policy, MTTI
Rajdai Jagarnauth	Senior Foreign Trade Officer, MTTI
Lance Wills	Senior Foreign Trade Officer, MTTI
Neville Totaram	Coordinator NACEN--Director General External Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Coby Frimpong	Advisor to the President
Lloyd R. Forde	Comptroller of Customs
Isqram Ali	Asycuda Project leader, Customs and Excise Department, Authority of Customs and Tariff.
Janet Kissoon	Investment Officer, Guyana Office for Investment
Malika Alleyne	Investment Officer--Guyana Office of Investment
Nigel Durrant	Head, Agricultural Project Cycle Unit (APCU) Ministry of Agriculture
Mr. Lennox Benjamin	Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Finance.

Private Sector

George Jardim,	Chairman, Private Sector Commission
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CARICOM

Ambassador Albert Ramdin	Assistant Secretary General Foreign and Community Relations (FORCOR), CARICOM Secretariat
Faye Housty	Director FORCOR
John Kissoon	CARICOM Secretariat
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Donor Agencies/Diplomatic Missions

Edward Glover	British High Commissioner
Kamoji Wachiira	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Maria Ralha	European Delegation
Ibrima Faal	International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Robert Kestell	IADB
Michael G. Wyllie	Director, Office of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States in Guyana.
Sheila Peters	Charge, US Embassy
Henry Bisharat	Political and Economic Officer, US Embassy
Adam Lynch	US Embassy Georgetown Foreign Service
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